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Abstract
Mass violence, almost no matter how defined, is (thankfully) rare. Rare
events are very difficult to study in a systematic manner. Standard statistical
procedures can fail badly and usefully accurate forecasts of rare events often
are little more than an aspiration. We offer an unconventional approach for
the statistical analysis of rare events illustrated by an extensive case study. We
report research whose goal is to learn about the attributes of very high risk
IPV perpetrators and the circumstances associated with their IPV incidents
reported to the police. Very high risk is defined as having a high probabil-
ity of committing a repeat IPV assault in which the victim is injured. Such
individuals represent a very small fraction of all IPV perpetrators; these acts
of violence are relatively rare. To learn about them nevertheless, we apply
in a novel fashion three algorithms sequentially to data collected from a large
metropolitan police department: stochastic gradient boosting, a genetic algo-
rithm inspired by natural selection, and agglomerative clustering. We try to
characterize not just perpetrators who on balance are predicted to re-offend,
∗Thoughtful comments and suggestions were provided by colleagues Aaron Chalfin, John Mac-
Donald, and Greg Ridgeway.
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but who are very likely to re-offend in a manner that leads to victim injuries.
With this strategy, we learn a lot. We also provide a new way to estimate
the importance of risk predictors. There are lessons for the study of other
rare forms of violence especially when instructive forecasts are sought. In the
absence of sufficiently accurate forecasts, scarce prevention resources cannot
be allocated where they are most needed.
1 Introduction
Forecasts of risk are routinely made in a wide variety of situations. What is the
probability that a hurricane will strike the Gulf Coast in a particular hurricane
season? What is the probability that a given high school student will be accepted by
his or her college of choice? What is the probability that a particular business firm
will declare bankruptcy? Coupled with each probability is the expected cost should
the event of concern occur. For the bankruptcy example, repayment of debt at 10
cents on the dollar means a loss of 90 cents for every dollar invested. Risk formally
is defined as the costs of a particular event multiplied by the probability that the
event will occur.
Forecasts of risk can be useful if they lead to actions that are better informed.
For undesirable outcomes, one hopes that prevention strategies can be implemented
or that plans for remedial action after the fact can be made. This has long been
well understood by criminal justice decision makers in the United States. Indeed,
risk assessments have been used to inform criminal justice decisions since the 1920s
(Burgess, 1928). One might wonder, therefore, whether forecasts of risk might be
instructive for contemporary incidents of mass violence. Without good forecasts,
scarce prevention and remedial resources easily can be misallocated.
For almost any reasonable definition of mass violence, constructing sufficiently
accurate forecasts is a daunting undertaking. This holds whether one is trying to
forecast the likely perpetrator, location, or timing of an event. One obstacle is that
mass violence is very heterogeneous. It can include, school shootings, homicides
committed by disgruntled employees, brutal hate crimes, systematic execution of
witnesses at a crime scene, fatal assaults by perpetrators of intimate partner violence
(IPV), and other mass violence in which the motives are obscure (e.g., the October,
2017 Las Vegas music festival mass shooting in which 58 people were killed and 851
were injured). Although understanding mass violence in general is an admirable
aspiration, in the medium term at least, different forms of mass violence might be
productively examined separately. Useful forecasts will probably require different
approaches for different kinds of mass violence because the risk factors and their
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importance will likely vary.
Another obstacle is achieving a consensus about what the most relevant observa-
tional units should be. One important distinction is between the settings in which the
violence occurs and the people found in these settings. Does one want a forecast for
a school as a whole or a forecast for each student in that school? Likewise, should
the observational units be businesses or their individual employees? What about
places of worship versus individual members of their congregations? In addition, the
setting may be a kind of event rather than a place. For example, the observational
units may be armed robbery incidents or rock concerts.
Even if clear definitions for different kinds of mass violence could be provided and,
for each, sensible observational units specified, a third obstacle is very low base rates.
One consequence is that the raw numbers of such events will be small, often in no
more than double digits. For example, one very large metropolitan area along the I-
95 corridor had in a recent year fewer than 10 homicides related to intimate partner
violence, and for none were there more than 3 victims; most had a single victim.
One would need to accumulate intimate partner homicides from across the country
to arrive at a mass violence total of more than a half dozen incidents. There is not
much information that can be extracted from so few observations, especially when
one might hope to learn what risk factors distinguish IPV mass violence incidents
from the hundreds of thousands of IPV incidents in which no one dies.
A more subtle concern is that very low base rates lead to very accurate but trivial
forecasts. For example, Time magazine reports that in 2018, there were a total of
17 “school shootings” in the United States (Wilson, 2018). Suppose during that
year there were about 100,000 public schools in the United States (National Center
for Education Statistics, 2018). The probability that any given public school will
victimized by a school shooting in that year is about .00017. If one had forecasted
that for any given school there will be no shootings in 2018, that forecast would have
been correct with a probability of over .999 using no risk factors whatsoever. It is
hard to imagine that any forecasting procedure using risk factors could do better. If
one proceeded nevertheless with standard statistical tools, it is likely that no useful
risk factors would be identified. The numerical methods used would rapidly conclude
that nothing to improve forecasting accuracy could be found. So why bother?1
1 It might seem that statistical modeling using extreme value distributions could solve the
problem (Coles, 2001). From a given type of extreme value distribution, one has the ability to
extrapolate to rare events in the tails. But even before getting into a number of difficult details,
one must know at least the form of the extreme value distribution, and in order to forecast, how
to include the role of predictors. In other words, one has a very demanding model specification
problem for phenomena that currently are poorly understood. One important risk is that untestable
assumptions will be introduced to justify a particular specification; what some disparagingly call
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The answer is lies in the costs of mass violence. Although mass violence is rare, it
can have devastating consequences. In addition to the tragic loss of life and the griev-
ing of family members and friends, mass violence can undermine trust in government
institutions to guarantee public safety. Mass violence also can weaken confidence in
appointed and elected public officials and elicit racial, ethnic and religious scape-
goating. For these reasons and others, efforts to reduce mass violence can be terribly
important. Risk forecasting can help, at least in principle. In this paper consider
ways to estimate the probabilities of mass violence assuming that the costs will be
large by almost any metric.
Hence, the challenge. Effective forecasts of mass violence may prove to be useful,
but the statistical obstacles are formidable. Herein, we will illustrate the potential of
a novel approach to forecasting rare events. In part because of our access to unique
data, the test bed is incidents of intimate partner violence in which the victim sustains
injuries. Such incidents are usually not crimes of mass violence, but, as a form of
intentional violence, raise many of the same statistical difficulties. In particular, for
a typical set of IPV incidents, cases in which the victim is injured are rare.
2 IPV Risk Assessment With Low Base Rates
Like most criminal justice risk assessments, risk assessments for intimate partner
violence (IPV) typically use very broad definitions of the forecasting target. Often
the forecasting target is simply the presence or absence of any actions that qualify
under existing statutes. A loud argument can suffice. At the other extreme can be
a lethal assault. Consequently, the usual search for risk factors can be compromised
by very heterogeneous outcomes. An important risk factor for an argument may be
an unimportant risk factor for an assault resulting in injuries.
A few studies have narrowed their focus to very serious forms of intimate partner
violence in which the victim is injured or even killed. Such outcomes make the
research extremely important. But to be effective, the research must overcome very
low base rates making identification of risk factors immensely difficult.
In the pages ahead, we address and try to circumvent the problems caused by low
base rates for IPV in which the victim is injured.2 Using a unique dataset, we focus
“assume and proceed statistics.”
2 One might think that a good meta-analysis could provide a solution to the low base rate
problem (Spencer and Stith, 2018). But at best, the only gain would be statistical power. As
discussed below, a low base rate can undercut the estimated contributions of all predictors because
it is very difficult to fit the data better than the marginal distribution of the highly unbalanced
response. A forecast for the more common outcome will be correct most of the time with no help
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on the attributes of very high risk IPV perpetrators and the circumstances associated
with their IPV incidents reported to the police. Very high risk is characterized as
having a high probability of committing a repeat IPV assault in which the victim is
injured.
Rather than rely solely on a conventional data analysis of IPV incidents, we apply
three algorithms sequentially to data from a large metropolitan police department:
stochastic gradient boosting, a genetic algorithm inspired by natural selection, and
agglomerative clustering. The first is used to define a fitness function, the second is
used to construct a population of very high risk IPV offenders, and the third is used
to help visualize the results. The constructed population does not have a problem
with low base rates and instructive results are obtained.
3 Past Research
The very large literature on risk factors for intimate partner violence can be organized
into three groupings. Some studies try to construct a causal account in which risk
factors are treated as causes. Pathbreaking work by Straus and Gelles (1990) is an
excellent example. Abransky and colleagues (2011) provide an international example.
Very recent research by Weitzman (2018) continues in this tradition, focusing on
how greater educational achievement for women can reduce victimization. For our
purposes, such work is peripheral because intimate partner violence typically is very
broadly defined. For example, intimate partner violence can be primarily comprised
of threats or can include serious injuries requiring medical care. These are treated
as different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon.
A second tradition uses risk factors to characterize the ongoing dangers faced
by victims of intimate partner violence. This approach can be traced back to work
by Campbell (1995), and has led to several important follow-up studies (Campbell
et al., 2003; 2007; 2009). Storey and Hart (2014) provide a recent example of the
strengths and weakness of this approach. Although the attention to very serious
intimate partner violence, often homicide, fits within our goals, the concern with
explanation rather than prediction does not. A risk factor that may help explain
why a homicide is more likely may have little forecasting power. Perhaps the major
hurdle for such research, however, is the very low base rate. Lethal intimate partner
violence, although certainly tragic, is very rare.
A final approach centers on forecasting, typically to help inform criminal justice
from the predictors whatsoever. There also are a variety of technical obstacles, especially when
meta-analysis is applied to observational data (Berk, 2007).
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actions (Berk, 2018; Berk et al., 2005; 2016; Cunha et al., 2016). There is usually no
causal account because risk factors are evaluated primarily by how much they im-
prove forecasting accuracy. The research cited can include intimate partner violence
in which there are injuries or even fatalities, but it too is challenged by very low base
rates.
4 Data
For all domestic violence dispatches confirmed as domestic violence cases by arriving
officers, a special offense form was filled out. We had worked with the local police
department to design the forms, which elicits a much wider range of information than
what had previously been collected. (The form is still in use.) We were provided
with a total of over 54,000 forms for the calendar year 2013. Each form characterized
a domestic violence incident.
Domestic violence was broadly defined, as is customary in law enforcement, to
include disputes between parents and children, between siblings, and other variants
on “domestic,” including intimate partners. We reorganized the data to include only
incidents of intimate partner violence with the perpetrator as the analysis unit. Once
irrelevant incidents were removed (e.g., a request for information only), there were
22,449 cases. For each perpetrator, we used the information in the earliest recorded
incident in 2013 as our platform to forecast whether the victim in any subsequent
incidents in that year was recorded by police as having physical injuries. Approxi-
mately 20% of the perpetrators in the initial incident had at least one subsequent
IPV incident in 2013, and approximately 5% had a subsequent IPV incident in 2013
in which the victim was injured. Repeat IPV incidents with reported victim injuries
are quite rare, which presents a substantial data analysis challenge. Nevertheless,
our response variable is the whether there is a subsequent IPV incident during 2013
in which the victim is injured. By “subsequent” we mean chronologically later than
the IPV incident in 2013 that is the source of the baseline data. Further details
about the data are provided in Small et al., 2019.
We selected all predictors from the collected offense forms for each perpetrator’s
initial IPV incident in 2013. The far left column of Table 2 shows the predictors used.
All are indicator variables coded so that a “1” represents the presence of the attribute
and a “0” represents the absence of the attribute. It will later help conceptually if
one thinks of a “1” as switching a predictor on and a “0” as switching a predictor
off. We will have much more to say about the predictors shortly.
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5 Methods
As an initial benchmark and to motivate our statistical approach, a conventional
logistic regression was applied to the data. Poor performance was expected. Because
95% of the perpetrators did not commit a new, reported IPV incident in which the
victim was injured, one can predict using no predictors that such an incident will
not occur and automatically be right 95% of the time. One cannot expect logistic
regression to do any better.
Distribution for Logistic Regression Probabilities
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Figure 1: Risk Probabilities from A Logistic Regression
Figure 1 illustrates the problem. The mass of fitted probabilities fall around .04,
and none exceed .27. The highest risk perpetrator had less than a 30% chance of
re-offending. With no fitted probabilities larger than .50, no perpetrators would be
forecasted to be reported for a new IPV incident in which the victim was injured.
Even with such difficult data, machine learning procedures can do better (Berk
and Bleich, 2013). We applied stochastic gradient boosting (gbm in R).3 Building
on past forecasting studies of domestic violence that used machine learning (Berk et
al., 2016), our target cost ratio treated false negatives as 10 times more costly than
false positives. In other words, it was 10 times worse failing to correctly classify an
3 Greg Ridgeway is the initial and primary author of gbm.
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IPV incident with injuries than failing to correctly classify an IPV incident with no
injuries.
We use the cost ratio as a place holder. When working with stakeholders on real
applications, the cost ratio becomes a policy preference they would need to specify.
But the 10-to-1 ratio is plausible. In any case, for the analyses that follow, the target
cost ratio is peripheral to our main concerns.
The data were randomly divided into training data having 20,000 observations
and test data having 2449 observations. For reasons that will be apparent later,
we will lean far more heavily on the training than the test data, which justifies
the substantially larger number of training observations. There is no other formal
rationale for our setting (cf. Faraway, 2016).
Because the outcome was binary, we used the conventional Bernoulli distribution
to define the boosting residuals. We retained all of the gbm default settings for the
tuning parameters except that interaction depth was set at 10 to help capture the
rare outcome events we were seeking. Reasonable variation in the tuning parameters
(e.g., an interaction depth of 6) made little difference. The number of iterations was
determined by 5-fold cross validation. There are difficult technical problems with
cross-validation, but it seems to perform well in practice (Hastie and Tibshirani,
2009, Section 7.10.). Such performance is very important for boosting, which can
badly overfit outcome probabilities (Mease et al., 2007).
The primary boosting output of interest was the learned fitting function that can
be used to construct fitted values, conventionally treated as probabilities. Here, they
convey the risk of a perpetrator committing a new IPV incident in which the victim
is injured. As discussed shortly, the fitted probabilities ranged from a little more .3
to a little less more than .70. About a quarter of the perpetrators were predicted to
re-offend in a manner leading to victim injuries (i.e., fitted probability > .50).
But these results also were unsatisfactory. Even with the 10-to-1 cost ratio, the
results were dominated by the perpetrators who did not re-offend because it was so
easy to fit those cases accurately. Moreover, many predictors that might have been
useful for identifying the repeat perpetrators could not be discerned because the un-
balanced response variable precluded them from having much impact on the boosting
loss function. In addition, the predictor values for the repeat, violent offenders, were
limited to those in the data set. There could well be many other kinds of very
high risk perpetrators with the same predictors but with different configurations of
predictor values.
For these reasons, we extended the analysis strategy. We applied a genetic algo-
rithm (Luke, 2013: Chapter 3; Mitchell, 1998) with the goal of constructing predictor
profiles that a variety of very high risk offenders might have. We were not limited
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to the actual predictor values for such offenders who were in our data. Insofar as a
substantial number of very high risk, hypothetical perpetrators “survived,” it would
be possible to determine which predictors and predictor values were responsible. Put
in other terms, using the genetic algorithm, we sought to construct a new popula-
tion of very high risk, violence prone perpetrators that could be studied in the same
way one would study an observed, empirical population. In this manner, we hoped
to circumvent, at least in part, the statistical problems caused by low base rates.
Genetic algorithms have been applied in economics, population genetics, ecology,
immunology, and biology (Mitchell, 1998: section 1.8); our application is novel.
We applied the GA procedure in R.4 The earlier gbm prediction module developed
from training data served as the fitness function. Perpetrators with larger predicted
probabilities to violently re-offend were defined as more fit. This meant that if
predictors for members of the hypothetical population of very high risk offenders
were used as input data for the learned boosting results, the predicted probabilities
of repeat violence would be well over .50.
100 populations, each with 500 perpetrators, were constructed sequentially by the
genetic algorithm, although there was little improvement after about the 20th popu-
lation. Just as with gbm, we found that the default values for the tuning parameters
worked quite well. There was no meaningful improvement when the tuning parame-
ters were varied within reasonable values. In the end, we had a single Frankensteinian
population of 500 unusually unsavory perpetrators.
Finally, we sought to characterize the most important predictors of repeat IPV
when the victim is injured and how those predictors were related to one another. In
addition to some simple calculations for the population of 500, we applied agglom-
erative clustering algorithm (Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 2005, Chapter 5), a form of
unsupervised learning (agnes in the cluster library in R). The clusters produced con-
firmed our earlier conclusions in an easily understood visualization. We also devised
a new way to estimate predictor importance.
6 Boosting Results
Table 1 shows a conventional machine learning classification table for the test data
constructed from the output of the stochastic gradient boosting application.5 Even
with an achieved 10-to-1 target cost ratio (i.e., 763/77 = 9.9), correctly classifying
4 GA was written by Luca Scrucca.
5 A machine learning classification table is often called a “confusion table.” It is a cross-tabulation
of the true categorical outcome by the fitted categorical outcome.
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the rare cases was difficult. The row labeled “Actual Injuries” shows that 47% of
the cases in which there was a repeat IPV incident with injuries were incorrectly
classified. Although a dramatic improvement over the logistic regression results, the
classification error rate for the rare events is hardly inspiring. The misclassification
rate when there are no injuries is smaller (33%), but because injury-free IPV is by
far the most common outcome, the classification task is much easier.
Turning from classification to forecasting shown in the columns of Table 1, the
target 10-to-1 cost ratio led to over 750 false positives that, in turn, resulted in a
forecasting error for repeat violence of 92%; forecasts of repeat violence would be
wrong 92% of the time.6 We do far better with forecasts of the absence repeat
violence, but an error rate of 4% is only slightly better than the 5% error rate
one would obtain by simply applying a Bayes classifier to the marginal distribution
of the response variable. In short, compared to the marginal distribution of the
the response variable, the predictors don’t help much if the goal is more accurate
forecasts, although the improvement for incidents in which there were no injuries
could be somewhat greater if the costs ratio were increased.7
Table 1: Stochastic Gradient Boosting Classification Table Using Test Data
Forecast No Injuries Forecast Injuries Classification error
Actual No Injuries 1542 763 0.33
Actual Injuries 77 67 0.47
Forecasting Error 0.04 0.92
For our purposes, far more instructive are the fitted values. Figure 2 shows
that the fitted probabilities range from a little more than .30 to a little more than
6 With the 10-to-1 cost ratio, false positives were, as a policy matter, very cheap. It is then no
surprise that the boosting algorithm works very hard to avoid false negatives, but not false positives.
Indeed, it is happy to trade a substantial number of false positives for fewer false negatives. Should
this tradeoff be unacceptable to stakeholders, the cost ratio is easily changed.
7 The preferred cost ratio is implemented as a special form of weighting. Therefore, one might
think that some form of weighting could be used to solve the low base rate problem; just give
the rare events more weight in the analysis. Even if such weighting could be justified by subject
matter considerations, any apparent gains could be misleading. No new information is being added.
Suppose there are 50 rare events, and one gives them double the weight. This is the same as counting
each rare event twice. Each rare event has an exact duplicate and as just illustrated, one is asking
for a substantial increase is false positives. In Table 1, use of asymmetric costs was introduced to
distribute the false negative and false positive classification errors in a way that was consistent with
specific policy preferences. That is a different problem.
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Figure 2: Risk Probabilities from Test Data for Stochastic Gradient Boosting
.70. Clearly, there is a dramatic improvement over the fitted values from the logistic
regression. A substantial number of fitted probabilities are to the right of .50, leading
to forecasts of victim injuries. However, from Table 1, we know that the majority
of these forecasts are false positives. Moreover, probabilities larger than .50 vary
widely with a small minority having the among the highest risk probabilities. Finally,
because the probabilities range widely, perhaps there is a range of etiologies leading
to IPV injuries. Perpetrators forecasted to injure their intimate partners can differ
substantially from one another. For example, some may on occasion lose control,
perhaps under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Some may use violence on a routine
basis systematically to enforce domination.
The far left column of Table 2 shows all of the predictors in order of their fitting
importance according to gbm. Fitting importance for a given predictor is defined as
the average reduction in the deviance over the boosted regression trees used by gbm.
That is, importance is the in-sample, average contribution to the fit of the data. The
second column shows the importance of each predictor as a proportion of the total
deviance accounted for over all predictors. We call this “in-sample importance.”8
By far, the most important predictor is whether the initial IPV incident occurred
8 Ideally, predictor importance would be computed in the test data, which would provide a
measure of “out-of-sample importance” (Berk, 2018).
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Table 2: Predictor Importance Forecasting Victim Injuries
Candidate Predictors In-Sample Commonality Switched On or Off
Importance Importance or In Between
Follow up > 3 months 27.12 1.00 Always On
Prior DV Reports 4.77 1.00 Always On
Victim < 30 3.64 1.00 Always On
Contact Information Given to Victim 3.48 0.00 Always Off
Offender Arrested 3.23 1.00 Always On
Offender < 30 3.18 1.00 Always On
Victim Frightened 3.13 0.43 In between
Offender Polite 3.08 0.00 Always Off
Currently Married 2.70 0.73 In between
Offender Cooperative 2.67 0.62 In between
Offender White 2.66 0.20 In between
Victim Shaking 2.66 0.44 In between
Visible Injuries 2.61 0.49 In Between
Offender Black 2.50 1.00 Always On
Victim Latina 2.44 0.68 In between
Victim Crying 2.34 0.49 In between
Children Present 2.33 0.49 In between
Offender Threatened 2.22 0.26 In between
Weapon Used 2.17 0.26 In Between
Former Relationship 2.10 0.31 In Between
PFA Ever 2.02 1.00 Always On
Offender Angry 1.95 0.42 In between
Offender Apologetic 1.82 0.12 In between
Furniture in Disarray 1.71 0.00 Always Off
Relationship Breaking Up 1.54 0.32 In between
Victim’s Clothes in Disarray 1.47 0.76 In between
Evidence Collected 1.38 0.76 In between
Offender Stalked 1.23 0.47 In between
Offender Strangled 1.17 0.63 In between
Taken to Hospital 1.13 0.36 In between
Formerly Married 1.12 0.35 In Between
Statements Taken from Kids 1.07 0.22 In between
Offender Broke In 0.74 0.22 In between
PFA Expired 0.57 0.51 In between
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in the first 90 days of 2013. Then, the followup period was between 9 and 12 months.
A partial dependence plot showed the relationship to be positive. The likely expla-
nation is that perpetrators who entered the study early in the year had more time
to re-offend. This is of little substantive interest, and serves as a sanity check on the
boosting results.
The second most important predictor is whether there had been prior domestic
violence reported to the police. The relationship is also positive and also not a
surprise. However, the relationship is weak. Even weaker is whether the offender is
under 30 years of age. The relationship is positive. When the offender is under 30,
the chances of a repeat incident with injuries are increased.
One can certainly proceed farther in this fashion, but it is not clear what of prac-
tical use is being learned. Beyond the single most important predictor, the fraction
of the fitted deviance attributed to each predictor is very small and often does not
materially differ from one predictor to another. One does not even have a meaningful
rank ordering.9 The predictor importance measure by used by gbm (i.e., the aver-
age standardized fraction of deviance “explained”) also provides no insight into how
forecasts or their accuracy are affected. There are better measures associated with
other machine learning procedures (e.g., Brieman, 2001). Finally, boosting is not
a model so that causal inferences are unjustified whatever the importance measure
computed (Berk, 2018).
For this analysis, an additional problem is that the importance measures in Ta-
ble 2 are produced by a fitting exercise in which it is extremely difficult to reduce
classification accuracy beyond applying a Bayes classifier to the marginal distribu-
tion. Many potentially important predictors for identifying high risk offenders may
not surface. Moreover, imposing an outcome class depending on which side of .50 a
risk probability falls obscures that there is range of values above .50 that could repre-
sent a variety different perpetrator types and true IPV risk. Finally, the measures of
importance are not immediately responsive to one of our motivating questions: what
do very high risk offenders have in common and how are such attributes related?
7 Genetic Algorithm Results
For those questions, we turn to the results from the genetic algorithm whose output
must be understood into the context of genetic algorithmic machinery. For this ap-
9 The procedure is stochastic gradient boosting and additional randomness is introduced by the
random subsetting into training and test data. Re-running the analysis several times from the
beginning produced classification tables almost the same as Table 1, but the importance measures
shuffle the order of all but the single most important predictor.
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plication, the values of indicator variables are randomly altered with no regard for
whether certain combinations of such values make subject-matter sense. The algo-
rithmic fitness function does not automatically weed out unlikely or even impossible
combinations of predictor values because all that matters is the probability of violent
re-offending. It has no inkling about predictor combinations of perpetrator values
that are actually not possible in reality. The result can be “unicorns,” interesting
perhaps, but ultimately not real. For example, there could be IPV outcomes in
which statements are taken from children in households where there are no children
reported. Such potential problems are exacerbated by errors in the offense reports.
Figure 3 shows that we now have a hypothetical population of 500 composed
almost entirely of very high risk perpetrators.10 Almost all have a risk probability of
.70 or larger. We now ask: what do these perpetrators have in common?
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Figure 3: Risk Probabilities from the Genetic Algorithm
10 The probability that an indicator predictor would have its value flipped as an offspring was
produced (a “mutation”) was set to .10. Changing it to .05 or .25 made no important difference
except for altering the number of populations needed before no further improvement was found.
The probability of a crossover (“sexual” reproduction) between a random pair of perpetrators when
an offspring was produced was set at .80. Dropping that value as low as .10 did not change the
results in an important way, although again, the number of populations needed changed somewhat.
The default crossover method was a “single point” procedure in which, for a single randomly chosen
perpetrator, all predictor values for columns to the right of a randomly chosen column are swapped
with the values for the same columns for another randomly chosen perpetrator (Umbarkar and
Smith, 2015, Section 2.1). By default, the fittest 5% of the cases automatically survived to the
next generation with no changes. Many of the background details can be found in Scrucca, 1993,
published the Journal of Statistical Software.
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We computed for each predictor the proportion of the simulated population for
which that predictor was switched on (i.e., that the predictor value was equal to 1).
For example, should, for a given predictor, that proportion be 1.0, all members of the
very high risk population have that predictor switched on. Should that proportion be,
say, 0.35, 35% members of the very high risk population have that predictor switched
on. Should that proportion be 0.0, all members of the very high risk population have
that predictor switched off. We call these proportions “commonality importance.”
The third column in Table 2 shows the commonality importance of each predictor.
Values range widely. Some have a value of 1.0, which means that for this population
they are always switched on. These are:
1. Follow-up > 3 months;
2. Prior DV Reports;
3. Offender < 30 Years Old;
4. Victim < 30 Years Old;
5. Offender Arrested;
6. Offender Black; and
7. PFA Now or in the Past (i.e., a court-issued protection from abuse order)
When switched on, each of these variables – except arrest – increase the prob-
ability of a subsequent repeat incident with injuries reported to the police. The
gbmpartial dependence plot shows that following an arrest, there is a slight reduc-
tion of .04 in the probability of a repeat IPV incident with injuries. Yet, all of the
perpetrators in the constructed, very high risk population had their arrest predictor
given a value of 1.0; All were characterized by an arrest at the initial IPV incident.
There seems to be a contradiction.
Police in this jurisdiction are required to make an arrest for IPV incidents involv-
ing injuries (Pennsylvania Statute, Crimes and Offenses, chapter 27, section 2711,
paragraph a). It follows that in reality, all of our high risk population would have
been arrested at the initial, reported incident. Perhaps an arrest reduces their esti-
mated risk, but not enough to remove them from the subset of very high risk subset
offenders. We return to the role of arrest later; there is more to the story.11 We
11 Recall that he partial dependence plots are constructed for all 20,000 perpetrators in the
training data, not for the 500 very high risk offenders.
15
D
RA
FT
also will consider in more depth the role of race. Still, at this point, six of the seven
predictors can be seen as potential aggravators.
Some predictors have a commonality importance value of 0.0, which means that
for this population they are always switched off. These are:
1. Victim Assistance Contract Information Given to the Victim (i.e., the contact
information was not given to the victim);12
2. Offender Polite (i.e., the offender was not police in his interaction with the
police); and
3. Furniture in Disarray (i.e., the furniture was not in disarray.).13
From the partial dependence plots we learn that had any of these been switched
on, the probability of a subsequent IPV incident in which the victim is injured is
increased. Because they are all switched off for this population of perpetrators, they
do not reduce subsequent violence. We think of the three predictors as potential
mitigators.
In short, Table 2 identifies potential aggravators and mitigators for the risk of
serious intimate partner violence. The archetypical perpetrator who injures his vic-
tim can be characterized by these aggravators and mitigators that often were not
apparent in the boosting measures of importance. Other variables in the table can
matter too, but they are not consistently switched on or off for this population of
500.
Although the simulated population of very high risk offenders was generated from
these data, it does not reproduce these data. There are no perfect matches. Across
each of the 34 predictors, a maximum of 27 predicators had values that were the
same for any perpetrator in the actual data and any perpetrator from the simulated
population. That should be no surprise because very few perpetrators in the data
had risk probabilities as high as those for the population of 500.
One might wonder how many of these very high risk offenders would be false
positives. There is no way to know because they are not included in the empirical
data; there is, for the simulated population, no “ground truth.” But from those data,
12 It is difficult to know what this predictor captures. Because all of the very high risk population
would have been arrested, the offender would have been removed from the scene. Under these
circumstances, the police might have understood that the department would actively follow up
with the victim.
13 When furniture is in disarray, perhaps the victim’s property rather than the victim herself is
the perpetrator’s target. For the initial incident, the victim is spared but the property destruction
might convey a threatening message.
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one can see that the number of false positives declines as the fitted risk probabilities
increases beyond .50. For these very high risk offenders, most of the forecasted
positives would probably be true positives.
8 Clustering Results
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Figure 4: Clustering of Injury IPV Predictors
In principle, a cluster analysis of the predictors should replicate the story ex-
tracted informally from Table 2 and add instructive visualizations. Predictors with
proportions of 1.0 should constitute one strong cluster, and predictors with propor-
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tions of 0.0 should constitute another strong cluster. Both extreme proportions imply
maximum similarity, a bit like a correlation of 1.0 and -1.0.
Figure 4 shows the dendrogram that results when an agglomerative clustering
algorithm (Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990, Chapter 5) is applied to the predictors
in the very high risk population.14 “Height” on the left margin of the figure is a
standardized measure of dissimilarity within a cluster that ranges from 0 to 1 and
necessarily gets larger when as one moves toward the top of the figure; the clustering
begins at the bottom of the figure for the predictors that are the least dissimilar.
The agglomerative coefficient at the bottom Figure 4, which also ranges from 0.0
to 1.0, is a standardized measure of cluster distinctness.15 The moderate coefficient
of .59 indicates that on the average, the clusters are quite distinct; the within-
cluster dissimilarities are on the average substantially smaller than the between-
cluster dissimilarities.
The cluster on the lower left reproduces the “always on” predictors from the far
right column in Table 2, but using the Gower measure not the importance commonal-
ity. Because the next predictor to join (Victim’s Clothes in Disarray) is substantially
higher (i.e., about .25), its distance from the cluster is meaningful.
Finding that Black offenders increase risk merits examination. The baseline cat-
egory is Hispanic offenders whose victims may be less inclined to call the police or
cooperate once they arrive. This reinforces a point made earlier: the correspondence
between IPV reported to the police and IPV not reported to the police can be far
from perfect. We have no direct evidence that the findings for Black IPV perpetra-
tors results from their victims being more inclined to report IPV incidents to the
police. Moreover, Table 2 documents that in the very high risk population we have
some members who are both White and Black. As noted earlier, this could result
from reporting errors on the offense forms, a coding errors when the forms were dig-
itized, or an artifact of the genetic algorithm.16 Whatever the cause, it undercuts
14 The process begins with the construction of dissimilarity matrix. Because the predictors
are binary, the Gower method was used as a measure of similarity (Kaufman and Rousseeuw,
1990: 235-236). When transformed into dissimilarities, the index becomes a measure of distance
between predictors. The algorithm starts with each predictor unclustered, finds the pair that is
least dissimilar and combines them in a cluster. For each unclustered predictor in turn, a mean
distance is computed between the within-cluster predictors and that predictor. In essence, the
closest predictor is then taken into the cluster, and the process continues. Clusters are combined
using similar reasoning based on the average distance between predictors in each possible pair of
clusters.
15 The details are beyond the scope of this discussion. See Kaufman and Rousseeuw 1990: 211-
212.
16 In principle, there are ways to avoid such anomalies. For example, cases with unrealistic
configurations of predictor values could be dropped from the population. One could also alter the
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any conclusions about the role of a perpetrator’s race.
The initial cluster to the right including Contacts To Victim, Polite Offender,
and Furniture In Disarray always have a proportion value of 0.0. These predictors
are always switched off. According to their partial dependence plots, each would
decrease the chances of injury when switched on. Therefore, one would not expect
them to be switched on for very high risk offenders. Because this cluster forms
at about the same height as the cluster with predictors always switched on, both
clusters have about the same, small within-cluster dissimilarity. If one wanted to
enlarge the cluster, the next predictor to join would be whether the offender broke
in. According to its partial dependence plot, it has almost no association with the
IPV repeat incidents in which the offender is injured although it seems associated
here with reductions in the probability injuries. Such events are so rare that it is
difficult to even speculate on what the association might mean.
Perhaps the most important conclusion from the clustering results is that selecting
as important only those predictors that are universally switched on or off is discarding
other useful information. The proportions in Table 2 provide information that could
also be exploited. It may be worth noting that the boosting importance measures
and the commonality importance measures sometimes order predictors in the same
way, especially for the predictors toward the very top of the table. But the predictors
highlighted can differ substantially as well.
9 A New Approach to Predictor Importance
A routine task in the development of criminal justice risk assessment tools is to
document how each risk factor affects forecasts of risk. Typically, some risk factors
will be alter risk forecasts more than others. Put another way, the credibility of risk
forecasts depends substantially on the weight given each the predictor as risk scores
are determined. We need to know how much each predictor “moves the needle.”
None of our earlier results provide the information.
Working broadly from machine learning traditions formalized by Leo Breiman
(2001), we developed new predictor importance measures implemented with the fol-
lowing steps.
1. Use the very high risk population of 500 as new data from which predicted
probabilities are desired. Figure 3 provides that information visually.
algorithmic code to prohibit some combinations of predictor values in the first place.
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2. Compute the mean risk probability to serve as a benchmark. This number is
the average risk probability when all of the predictors are set to the values
determined by the genetic algorithm.
3. Construct new datasets, one for each of the predictors with a universal 1.0 or
a universal 0.0. There will be 10 such datasets, each containing the full set of
predictors (34 in our case).
4. For one of the 10 new datasets, select a predictor that is universally 1.0 or 0.0.
Apply reverse coding for that predictor.17 For example, with the new dataset
for the predictor Prior DV Reports, recode the 1s to 0s. All other predictor
values are unchanged. Repeat the reverse coding within each dataset, so that
each predictor has its own dataset in which it alone has been reverse coded.
5. Using the boosting algorithmic structure found earlier, obtain the 500 predicted
probabilities of a repeat IPV incident in which the victim is injured separately
for each of the 10 datasets. There will be 10 sets of predicted probabilities.
6. Compute the mean of the predicted risk probabilities separately for each dataset.
7. Compare each of these means to the mean probability when no predictors are
recoded.18
Table 3 shows the results. The mean risk probability in the population of 500
is 0.718. This is the value of the benchmark. When each predictor is reverse coded
(one at a time), the mean probability will drop in value. The larger the drop, the
greater the impact that predictor has on the average risk.
Clearly, the largest impact by far is for the length of the follow up. The average
risk probability drops from 0.718 to 0.431 when its values are recoded from 1.0 to
0.0. The next largest impact is far smaller. The average risk probability for Prior
DV reports is 0.612 when its values are recoded from 1.0 to 0.0. Next, in order,
the mean probability risk for furniture in disarray falls to 0.642 when its values are
17 If the predictor in question is universally a 1.0, recode it to 0.0. If the predictor in question is
universally a 0.0, recode it to 1.0. There is no formal need to limit this process to predictors that
are, for all members of the population, either equal 1.0 or 0.0. But these are the predictors that
have the most promise of substantial importance because all 500 values will be recoded. If, for a
given predictor, the proportion of 1s is, say, only .60, only 60% of the values will be recoded.
18 One could accomplish the same thing with single dataset (not 10) by reverse coding a given
“universal predictor,” obtaining the desired estimate, reversing the reverse coding, and repeating
the process for each universal predictor one at a time. It is here conceptually and operationally
more direct to work with one dataset set for each universal predictor.
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Table 3: Mean Risk Probabilities Computed by Reverse Coding
Variable Recoded Mean Risk Probability
None 0.718
Follow up >3 months: 1.0 to 0.0 0.431
Prior DV Reports: 1.0 to 0.0 0.612
Victim < 30: 1.0 to 0.0 0.712
Offender < 30: 1.0 to 0.0 0.700
Offender Arrested: 1.0 to 0.0 0.701
Offender Black: 1.0 to 0.0 0.664
Ever having a PFA: 1.0 to 0.0 0.709
Contact information given to the Victim: 0.0 to 1.0 0.662
Offender Polite: 0.0 to 1.0 0.683
Furniture in Disarray: 0.0 to 1.0 0.642
recoded from 0.0 to 0.1. If one proceeds through the table, the smallest impact is
for victims under 30 years of age when its values are recoded from 1.0 to 0.0. The
mean risk probability for victims under 30 years of aged is 0.712.19
The reduction for the arrest variable is curious. From the boosting partial de-
pendence plots, an arrest reduced the estimated probability of new IPV violence.
But here we see that when an arrest is not made, the probability of subsequent IPV
resulting in injuries declines. If one or both of the results are not a product of some
statistical artifact or errors in the offense forms, the impact of an arrest differs for
the actual, rather heterogeneous population of perpetrators compared to the con-
structed, homogeneous, very high risk population. Alternatively, the arrest variable
may be in part of a proxy for factors not measured in the dataset. In the very high
risk population, for example, an arrest and a perpetrator’s response to it, may deter
a victim from reporting subsequent IPV incidents.
Clearly, the universal predictors can reduce mean risk probabilities by meaningful
amounts for this very high risk population. Less clear is whether differences in impact
between the predictors should be taken seriously. We re-ran the genetic algorithm
several times and although by and large the same predictors were universally 1.0 or
0.0, the impact on predicted risk changed a bit, usually in the second or third decimal
19 These measures of importance isolate the impact of the given predictor with all else held
constant in the sense that none of the other predictors are recoded. This is in the spirit of an
experiment; only the “treatment” is varied.
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place. With the exception of the length of the follow-up period, this was sometimes
enough to reorder the predictors in their importance.20 Modest re-rankings of this
sort are not surprising because the genetics algorithm has random processes built it.
The fitness function used by the genetic algorithm is no doubt highly dependent
on the training data and on the cost ratio imposed. Any thoughts of generalizing the
findings for variable importance are surely premature. Yet, although the performance
of the boosting algorithm was somewhat disappointing, its fitness function when used
in concert the the genetic algorithm led to results that are worth thinking hard about.
10 Conclusions
Perhaps it helps to restate the challenge. For incidents of mass violence, base rates
will be very low. Conventional forms of analysis likely will stumble; our logistic
regression results are an instructive example. The choice for research and policy,
therefore, is either to abandon serious statistical science or consider rather new ap-
proaches to data with low base rates. It this paper, we offer very tentatively a
promising option.
Machine learning (i.e., stochastic gradient boosting) performed far better than the
logistic regression, but still fell short of forecasting accuracy that one would ordinarily
require (Berk, 2018). When the boosting results were used to construct a fitness
function, the genetic algorithm produced outcomes that seem far more interesting.
Some predictors, which to our knowledge had never been evaluated before, surfaced
as important. From the hypothetical population of 500, we also learned which of
our predictors appeared to perform as aggravators and which appeared to perform
as mitigators and how large their impacts were on forecasted risk.
We used IPV incidents reported to law enforcement as our observational units.
Although these data allow for an illustrative application, our results must been seen
through the lens of IPV incidents reported to the police. Reported IPV incidents
have important similarities to all IPV incidents, but they can be different enough to
warrant caution when trying to generalize from reported incidents to all incidents.
Whether an IPV incident is reported to authorities introduces a systematic differ-
ence, even if potentially small, between the two kinds of incidents. The associations
between our predictors and subsequent, violent IPV not reported to law enforcement
may differ in strength, and perhaps even in direction.
20 The very few times one of a universal predictor had less than all 1s or all 0s, the proportion of
1s or 0s was still very large. And on the rare occasion when a new universal predictor surfaced, it
earlier had a large proportion of 1s or 0s.
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Although motivated by risk assessment prediction, this paper stops well short of
forecasting. In addition, because there is no model of risk, no causal claims can be
made. Speculation that some of the associations found may be causal is insufficient.
Our intent is to show how a sequence of machine learning algorithms can extract
plausible features of a rare population that would not surface from a conventional
data analysis alone. In subsequent work, these features might dramatically improve
forecasting accuracy for the subset of IPV offenders who pose the greatest risk of
injury to victims. In the meantime, they may serve as an instructive checklist of
warning signs for violent IPV that at the very least has substantial face validity.
Our methodological conclusions also are offered in a highly provisional manner.
As best we can tell, our approach is novel. The challenges inherent in low base rates
may require extending existing data analysis tools beyond conventional practice.
This paper is a proposal for one way that might be done.
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